Aristotle & Deliberation

What does Aristotle think is involved in deliberating well about how to act?

Introduction

Aristotle writes about deliberating well, primarily in Books III and VI. This essay will present one interpretation of Aristotle’s account of deliberation and deliberating well in Book III and Books VI and VII and then assess the objections that the accounts are incompatible.

It is my contention that Aristotle doesn’t present a contradictory account of deliberating well, but books VI and VII are a continuation of book III.

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Aristotle's account of deliberation and deliberating well in Book III

First, in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle presents an account of deliberation being only things within “our power and can be done” (1112a 30). Meaning deliberation is concerned with the possible choice of action. Therefore, you cannot deliberate on things you can’t choose. For example, “no Spartan deliberates about the best constitution for the Scythians” (1112a 25). This is because the Spartans have no choice in the best constitution of the Scythians in the same way we don’t have a choice in the weather tomorrow. Deliberation requires the agent to have the power to choose the result of deliberation. Deliberation, then, is not merely practical reasoning without the possibility of choosing or action but requires the possibility of action. 

One objection may be against the Spartan example as, although it seems no one could deliberate about growing wings, it does seem political truth can be deliberated. Aristotle himself deliberated the “best form of the constitution” in the Politics (1323a1). Thus, this account of deliberation is too restrictive. However, Aristotle isn’t arguing that if were asked, “which constitution is best for the Scythians?” one cannot deliberate about an answer, but rather one can’t deliberate what is the best actual constitution is. The distinction is between actions expressing belief and actions of implementation. There is still a chosen action, namely the expression of belief by answering the question, which can be chosen as a result of deliberation. But you couldn’t deliberate on and then choose the actual constitution to be implemented. Thus, this isn’t a counterexample of this interpretation of deliberation.

Second, Aristotle writes that deliberation is “not about ends but about means” (1112b 10). Aristotle gives several examples where a doctor, orator, statesman or anyone who has a telos can only deliberate on the means to that telos (End). For example, a Doctor doesn’t deliberate the end of whether he ought to heal or not, by virtue of being a doctor (1112b 10). The telos of health is explicit to the nature of doctor. Consequently, the end is fixed in cases such as the doctor and deliberation chooses the mean towards achieving the end.
One objection may be hospitals today. For example, a doctor with a patient who has aggressive cancer may deliberate if treatment and the suffering caused to extend their life for an extra week is worth doing. However, if a doctor, by definition, has the telos of health, then these cases are examples where the person, acting outside the role of doctor, may deliberate with the person with cancer. Thus, is not a counter-example where a doctor seems to deliberate about the end of health but a person outside of the role of doctor deliberating what is best. Consequently, this account of deliberation argues that deliberation is choosing the means to an already known goal in cases such as the doctor.

Third, deliberating well is when we find the means towards the ends “by which it is most easily and best produced” (1112b 15). For example, a doctor is presented with a patient with cancer, there may be several treatments. Thus, for a doctor to deliberate well, they would be choosing the most effective treatment to gain the end of health in the patient. Although chemotherapy may be one means to attaining health, surgery, where they cut away the cancerous tissue, may be just as or more effective at attaining the goal of health. An example, of deliberating poorly would be using leeches to cure cancer as this is one of the least effective ways of producing the end of health. Consequently, to deliberate well is to also deliberate effective means to an end.

Therefore, in book III, we get an account of what deliberation is and how to deliberate well, being the ability to find the most efficient means towards an attainable end within our power to choose.

Aristotle's account of deliberation and deliberating well in Book VI

In Book VI, we see a continuation of Aristotle's view of deliberating well regarding the highest good being Practical Wisdom (Phronesis). Aristotle writes that the person of practical wisdom “deliberates well” if they are “capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action” (NE VI.7). What is best for man is what is eudemon. Thus, the practically wise person correctly aims towards the telos of eudemonia. Aristotle also writes that practical wisdom is a “True and reason state capacity act” (NE VI.5). Thus, Phronesis and deliberating well is using correct rationality, being able to use reason to attain the right end, for actions. Therefore, deliberating well is using practical wisdom to reason what action is eudemon. Where we saw the Doctor deliberating when he decerns the mean towards the telos of Health, Book VI argues that for people to deliberate well, we must have Phronesis which starts with the telos of Eudemonia or happiness, which is ultimately the “thing conduce to the good life in general” (NE, VI.5). Then, correctly determines through rationality, the actions to attain that end.

Second, Aristotle argues that deliberating well, or Phronesis (Practical Wisdom), is different from political wisdom since Phronesis: first, it is an excellence and not an art, and second, it is concerned with particulars and not just universals (NE VI.8).

First, Aristotle writes that Phronesis is concerned not with “universals only—it must also recognise the particulars” (NE VI.8). This is to say that deliberating well doesn’t produce action which we ought to choose universally, such as the action eating when hungry is eudemon, as there may be exceptions to the case. Whereas political wisdom is concerned with universals only as it is legislative. Thus, Phronesis or deliberation well isn’t a universal knowledge you can have but relates to particular situations too.
Second, Aristotle writes, “Practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art”(NE VI.5). Since Phronesis is a “true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good,” then it's deliberating well can’t be done poorly. For example, if you have Phronesis and deliberate well towards eudemonia by means of friendship or virtue etc. You either correctly have the right mean to the end of eudaimonia or you don’t. An art, such as bookshelf making, can be better or worse in terms of its telos of holding books. However, deliberating about the action, such as friendship, towards its end, eudaimonia, cannot be better or worse action as you have a friendship or you don’t. Thus, you either have Phronesis and can deliberating well with regard to the highest good or you do not have Phronesis. You can’t have a less excellent Phronesis.

Therefore, Boon VI account of deliberating well is phronesis, the ability to correctly deliberate toward eudemonia, in universal and particular cases.​​
 

Incompatibility objection
One objection against this interpretation of Aristotle's account of deliberating well about how to act is that Book III present contradictory accounts of deliberation to Book VI and VII.
An inclusive view of eudaimonia holds that the means for the end of eudaimonia constitute the end. For example, Aristotle writes, “honour, pleasure, reason, and every excellence … we choose them also for the sake of happiness” (NE I.7). On an inclusive view, the mean of attaining eudaimonia, like friendship or virtues, constitutes what eudaimonia or happiness is.
Therefore, if Book III argues that deliberation is only a technical means-end analysis, so the end can never be deliberated, this seems to contradict Book VI, which allows deliberation of what constitutes the eudemon (the telos of humans). The clearest example of Book III preventing deliberation about ends is “we deliberate not about ends but about means” (1112b 10). Consequently, the technical account in Book III is incompatible with Books VI and VII.

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Rebuttal to the Incompatibility objection

Wiggins, in “Deliberation and practical reason”, presents an argument for Book VI and VII being a continuation of Book III by addressing the problematic cases where Book III is interpreted as means to ends reasoning in cases like deliberating eudaimonia.

First, Wiggins addresses the problem in texts such as 1112b 10 above by translating “Pros to telos” as “what is towards the end” rather than the restrictive “means to end” (Wiggins, pp32). Thus, this translation allows the deliberation to be the means to the end but also includes the means in which “existence counts in itself as the partial or total realisation of the end”, like in the case of eudemonia (Wiggins, pp32). Therefore, the translation doesn’t directly contradict books VI and VII as it allows cases such as an inclusive view of eudaimonia if the means are towards the end because it is not strictly mean only, to ends.

One may object by saying 1112b 10 above seems to suggest we cannot deliberate towards the ends (Wiggins, pp34). The text is directly saying that one can’t deliberate about any ends, including ends which constitute eudaimonia. However, he argues that the example of ends in 1112b 10 are “already fixed” and so “no longer needed to be deliberated” ( Wiggins, pp35). 1112b 10 refers to the ends of the doctor, oratory and statesmen where they have one fixed end in the example. For example, the doctor's fixed end is health, thus doesn’t need to deliberate about the plural ends. Therefore, if it is referring to the technical examples, then it is not referring to cases where the means towards the end constitute the end.

Second, he addresses the objection that Happiness or eudaimonia on an inclusive view is a constitute of its means, thus if we deliberate what is towards the end, eudaimonia, we also deliberate the end (Wiggins, pp35). This contradicts the view that you can’t deliberate about the end. However, it is not the case that a person deliberates their end as to whether to have eudaimonia as their end but rather, the end is fixed as eudaimonia. Thus, when it says one can’t “deliberate about his end”, this doesn’t contradict books VI and VII with regards to the telos being fixed. As Wiggins writes, “if the desirability of eudaimonia were really up for debate then nothing suitable by way of practical or ethical concern or by way of desire would be left over” (Wiggins, pp36). In this regard, eudaimonia isn’t deliberated.

But the issue of deliberating the means which may constitute the telos still seems to be problematic as it is deliberating aspects of what constitutes the end even if it is not deliberating what the end should be. However, Wiggins argues we can “deliberate to make more specific and more practically determinate that generalised telos of eudaimonia” (Wiggins, xxx, pp36). Thus, when we deliberate the means, which constitute the end, of eudemonia, we aren’t deliberating to have eudaimonia as our telos or if being unhealthy should be what eudemonia should be but rather making clear what exactly qualifies and constitutes eudemonia. In the same way, a doctor has the end of heal but must know what qualifies as healthy. Thus, this doesn’t contradict Book III as deliberation constitutes ends, like eudaimonia, isn’t deliberation to have or not have it as a telos but rather making clearer what qualifies as eudaimonia. Further, the reason, this apparent contradiction arises, Wiggins argues, is due to Aristotle's focus on “simple situation” like the doctor's example where we have determined fixed ends (Wiggins, pp30). But there isn’t any reason deliberation is limited to these examples.

Consequently, this presents a good defence against the incompatibility of book III and books VI and VII to prevent Book III from restricting deliberation to mean only but rather what is towards the telos. Consequently, book III and books VI and VII both allow phronesis or deliberating well to include deliberation of eudemonia.

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Objection to the compatibilist interpretation

One may reject the attempt to show that Book III and Books VI and VII are compatible by questioning if one is changing what Aristotle intended in his writing. Consequently, we shouldn’t interpret Book III to be more then a technical mean end account of deliberation to fit with book VI and VII.

Rebuttal to the compatibilist objection

However, there are two reasons why the compatibilist view is more likely what Aristotle thought.

First, if there is an interpretation which prevents incompatibility in a philosopher's writings, one should favour the compatible one as this presents the strongest argument for the philosopher, thus preventing a strawman’s.

Second, Wiggins gives an argument to favour his interpretation over others as it prevents incompatibilities within Book III itself (Wiggins, pp30). First, as we have argued when Aristotle wrote deliberation must be within “our power and can be done”, he is arguing that choice is the result of deliberation as it requires the ability for the agent to choose means within their power (1112a 30). Second, Aristotle also writes that choice is “Bound up with virtue and to discriminate character better than actions do”(1111b6). This is to say we can discriminate virtues character from a bad one with choice. If choice, which is the result of deliberation, can discriminate between vice and virtues then deliberation and the resulting choice can’t be deliberation of only the means, as the person with bad character, who chooses vice, could have excellent deliberation and choice, in regards to deliberating the means, but a “Misconception of the end” leading to them choosing vice (Wiggins, pp31). Thus, one could be excellent at identifying the means but fail to choose what is virtuous based on the misconception of the end. This would then mean choice couldn’t discriminate virtue or vice as choice and deliberation can mistake the end. Therefore, we have good reason to favour the compatible interpretation as a solely means ends interpretation causes contradictions in Book III.

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Conclusion

In conclusion, this essay has presented an account of what Aristotle thinks is involved in deliberation and deliberating well about how to act. I have also assessed possible objections to that account from incompatibility between book III and books VI and VII and why we should favour a compatibilist view. Thus, this leads to Aristotle's view about deliberating well about how to act as the ability to correctly calculate towards eudaimonia the most efficient means towards an attainable end within our power to choose.

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Bibliography:

- Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944.

-Aristotle Translated by W. D. Ross, (1999) Nicomachean Ethics, Kitchener, Batoche Books

-Wiggins. D. Deliberation and Practical Reason. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 76 (1975 - 1976), pp. 29-51+viii (24 pages)

- Ostwald, M. (1999) Nicomachean Ethics Book VI. Available at: https://mason.gmu.edu/~rcherubi/nevi.htm (Accessed: 05/04/23).

-Patterson C.H., Robert J. (2023) CliffsNotes on Ethics Available at: https://www.cliffsnotes.com/literature/e/ethics/summary-and-analysis/book-vi-analysis-for-book-vi (Accessed: 05/04/23).

-Crifasi, A. (1998) Are Ends Subject to Deliberation in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics? A Reply to David Wiggins. Binghamton University Available at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1393&context=sagp (Accessed: 05/04/23).

-Russell, D. (2014). Phronesis and the Virtues (NE vi 12–13). In R. Polansky (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, pp. 203-220).

-Everson. S (2023) Aristotle seminars weeks 7, University of York
-Everson. S (2023) Aristotle seminars weeks 8, University of York

--Everson. S (2023) Aristotle seminars weeks 9, University of York