Divine Hiddenness

Introduction
Divine hiddenness refers to the absence of God where a person believes God lacks perceivable existence or presence in their life. Divine hiddenness is a common experience. From the beginning of the Bible when Job says to God ‘I cry out to you, and you do not answer’ (Job 30:20). To modern-day saints like Mother Teresa who experienced separation from God towards the end of her life (De Cruz, 2016, p53). God’s presence is not always felt by everyone, and those closest to God often experience divine hiddenness.

Divine hiddenness has led some philosophers to argue an omnibenevolent God must not exist as divine hiddenness contradicts an omnibenevolent nature. The Christian Tradition holds that God is supremely good and thus an all-loving being who desires union and the good of every person. This is evidenced by Christ's sacrificial death on the cross which opened the possibility for all to be free from sin and in a state of union with God in heaven. However, if God loves and thus desires union with every person, then why does God hide? This problem is exhausted when considering people who want there to be a loving and just God but cannot believe there is such a being because God is hiding from them. In these cases, God is preventing union which seems to contradict his omnibenevolent nature.

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In this essay, I will present one of the most prominent divine hiddenness arguments against an omnibenevolent God by Schulenburg. I will then assess objections from Moser and Stump which shed light on the problem. It is my contention, that divine hiddenness does not contradict an omnibenevolent God.

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Schellenberg's argument

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Schellenberg presents a persuasive argument for the incompatibility between an omnibenevolent God and divine hiddenness. The essence of his argument can be summarised as follows (Schellenberg, 2021, p65):
P1: If an all-loving God exists, then God is always open to a personal relationship
P2: If a person is non-resistant then they are able and would be willing to enter into a personal relationship.
P3: A personal relationship requires both individuals to have propositional belief that the other person exists.
P4: If God is always open to a personal relationship, then no non-resistant person would lack the propositional belief God exists. (From 1, 2 and 3)
Sub-conclusion: If an all-loving God exists there are no non-resistant people who lack propositional beliefs that God exists (From 1 and 4)
P5: There is ‘at least one’ non-resistant person who lacks propositional belief that God exists
Conclusion: An all-loving God does not exist.

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Openness to personal relationships
Before assessing Schellenberg's argument it is important to note he has a technical understanding of openness to a personal relationship.

Schellenberg writes that a personal relationship is a ‘positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship’; both parties are aware of and desire meaningful union with each other (Schellenberg, 2021, p65). Consequently, a relationship which is not ‘reciprocal’, ‘meaningful’ or ‘conscious’ is not a personal relationship. It then seems rational to believe that a personal relationship requires the propositional belief that each other exists (premise 3) as how can you be conscious of the other person without believing they exist? Or give in a reciprocal relationship if you do not believe there is something you are giving yourself to. Or have a meaningful relationship with a person you don’t believe exists. An analogy is found in our daily lives, every personal relationship you have is with someone you believe exists. The propositional belief was essential for the personal relationship to start. Consequently, lacking this propositional belief prevents a personal relationship.

  

Following this, Schellenberg argues an agent, B, is not open to a personal relationship with another person, A, if person A currently lacks belief that person B exists which person B “at that time knows this and could ensure that … [person A’s non-belief] changed to belief” but chooses not to (Schellenberg, 2021, p64). In other words, an individual is not open to a personal relationship if despite knowing a person lacks the propositional belief in their existence and having the ability to easily remove this impediment, they choose not to. In the divine hiddenness argument, if God knows of a barrier to a personal relationship, like a lack of belief in God's existence, which could be easily removed and would lead to a personal relationship then God would ensure this barrier is removed if he is always open to a personal relationship.

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It is important to note that Schellenberg does not argue that an omnibenevolent all-loving God would remove this impediment from every person. Rather an all-loving God would remove this barrier to a personal relationship if they were ‘non-resistant’ to a personal relationship (Schellenberg, 2021, p65). Non-resistance can be simply understood as a person who, if they knew God existed, would want a personal relationship with God. A clear example might be someone who would desire a loving and just God but, due to lack of perceived existence of God, fails to believe or have a personal relationship with God. Despite this, they are still open to this relationship if they come to believe a loving God exists. This allows a person who doesn’t want a relationship with God to lack propositional belief which might be more loving since God, an all-powerful being, has an immensely powerful moral authority which could overwhelm an agent's ability to choose a personal relationship freely. This imbalance of power is not abused by God giving propositional knowledge to those who are already open to a personal relationship as they want this relationship.

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Divine hiddenness contradicting omnibenevolence
From Schellenberg's account of openness and his argument, he has presented a compelling case against an omnibenevolent God since divine hiddenness contradicts God’s all-loving nature.

The Christian tradition maintains that an omnibenevolent God is all-loving and, therefore, desires union and the good of every person (Stump, 2006, p27). If God desires union, then God must be always open to union and a personal relationship with every person (premise 1). Consequently, if there is a non-resident non-believer, a person who is open to a personal relationship but has an impediment like a lack of propositional belief (premise 2), then God would remove this impediment and give them propositional belief (premises 3 and 4). However, because there exist people who are non-resistant non-believers (premise 5) then an omnibenevolent God must not exist as he has not removed this impediment. God, who is omnipotent, omniscient, etc, could easily bring about the person gain propositional belief and a personal relationship. But since he does not, then we have a good argument to believe an omnibenevolent God does not exist as there are cases of divine hiddenness which contradict his loving nature.

A strength of Shallenberger's argument is that is it empirically testable. There seem to be many people who are non-resistant to a relationship with God and even desire a loving God but because they do not believe God exists, which seems out of their control, they fail to have a personal relationship with God. Consequently, an omnibenevolent God does not exist as these cases of divine hiddenness are incompatible with God's loving nature.

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Moser Filial Relationship objections

Moser presents a challenge to Schellenberg’s argument by distinguishing between being ‘Actively’ and ‘Passively’ non-resistant and arguing there are no active non-resistant non-believers (Moser, 2009, p142).

Passive non-resistance is being ‘open to belief’ in God but having an ‘insufficiently serious attitude towards available evidence for God’ (Moser, 2009, p142). They are ‘morally indifferent in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ’ and therefore have no or little interest in being morally transformed or loving God. They may be open to a personal relationship, but one between equals where they can remain habituated to vice instead of submitting to God's goodness. Alternatively, their non-resistance to a personal relationship might be driven by curiosity about God, a form of ‘cognitive idolatry’ that doesn't desire a loving relationship (Moser, 2009, p. 130).

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Active non-resistance ‘takes a morally serious interest in the availability of evidence for God … [and its] morally transforming effects’ (Moser, 2009, p142). They are ‘actively willing to be morally transformed toward the character of God’ through ‘filial knowledge of God’. Therefore, active non-resistant agents desire a filial relationship with God. A filial relationship requires one to ‘humbly, faithfully and lovingly standing in a child-parent relation’ to God (Moser, 2020, p179). From this distinction, we can view active as desiring a loving filial relationship and passive as wanting a personal non-filial relationship.

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Moser argues that there can be many passive non-resistant non-believers without this contradicting God's omnibenevolent nature. An all-loving God desires the good and union with everyone but that does not mean God must be open to any type of union or personal relationship. God desires a ‘morally serious loving’ or filial relationship with people, as this wills the good and brings them into closer union with Himself (Moser, 2009, p145). Therefore, a passive personal relationship is not one God is obligated to produce. Such a relationship is not morally serious or loving and may be detrimental to the desires of union and a person’s good. For example, the personal relationship between equals, where a person can remain habituated to vice, is not only detrimental to their own good but could provide a barrier to complete union with God since they desire vice over a loving relationship with God. Instead of loving God and wanting to be transformed towards the good they desire their vices above a loving relationship with God. Consequently, Moser argues these cases of divine hiddenness are not contradictory to an omnibenevolent God.

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Instead, Moser argues that there are no active non-resistant non-believers as God would give them propositional knowledge if they desired a loving filial relationship (Moser, 2009, p145). Moser’s objection argues an all-loving God desires a personal filial relationship with people actively non-resistant (Against premise 4) and argues there are no active non-resistant non-believers (Against premise 5). Therefore, Schellenberg's argument has not shown the incompatibility between divine hiddenness and omnibenevolent God. The only non-resistant people who lack belief in God are people who ultimately do not desire a filial relationship with God. Their ultimate desire might be to satisfy an intellectual inquiry about God, or they may want a personal relationship with God to punish people they dislike or a God which allows them to remain attached to vice. This is a form of idolatry as God is none of these things. Rather God is like a loving father who wants a person to be free from sin and in union with him. Therefore, God is not obligated to give propositional belief to people only wanting passive personal relationships.

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Quiescence, Grace and a Filial Relationship

Moser’s claim that there are no active non-resistant non-believers does not rely upon empirical evidence alone. The Doctrine of Grace provided a theological argument for there being no active non-resistant non-believers.

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Filial Desire and Grace
An active non-resistant agent is a person who desires a loving filial relationship with God. However, Christianity teaches that fallen humanity is not ‘capable of some good act without grace’, as this would constitute the Pelagian heresy (Stump, 2003, p401). Consequently, A person cannot desire a filial relationship with God without grace, as this is a good act of the will. Therefore, an active non-resistant agent who desires a filial relationship has grace efficacious within them.  This is supported by Pinsent who writes ‘Grace imprints the development of a person’s moral, intellectual, and spiritual dispositions… [which allows us to relate as] children of God. (Pinsent, 2021, p1). In other words, it is grace that allows us to desire a filial relationship with God and call God our Father in a meaningful way. Therefore, to be an active non-resistant agent requires receiving the gift of grace from God.

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The Thomist account of Grace
As grace is needed for a person to become an active non-resistant agent it is important to give an account of how one receives grace. An all-loving God would always offer this gift of grace since he is always open to a filial relationship. Nevertheless, God would not force this grace upon us as this would violate our free will and contradict his loving nature.

However, Pelagianism states that a person cannot desire a filial relationship with God or accept his grace since this would be a good action. Therefore, we are faced with a problem either God imposes grace on people, violating their free will or we fall into Pelagianism. Elenore Stump presents the Catholic Thomist account of grace and how someone can desire a filial relationship through God’s grace, without being Pelagian or violating free will (Stump, 2003, p389).

Stump writes for a person to desire a filial relationship with God they require the ‘grace of justifying faith’ (Stump, 2003, p394). Since we cannot want a filial relationship then a person rejects (or rather does not want) a filial relationship with God. If our will is rejecting God's grace and a filial relationship, then it would violate our free will if God infused justifying grace upon us. However, Stump presents an alternative third state of the will which allows God to infuse a person with justifying grace without opposing their free will or being Pelagian. Namely, if an agent's will is ‘Quiescent’ ‘a state of privation’ (Stump, 2003, p395). In other words, a person no longer rejects but also does not accept a filial relationship with God.

This preserves free will since God is acting as a ‘formal’ rather than an ‘efficient’ cause (Stump, 2003, p392). An efficient cause would violate free will as it would give a person a graced will that opposed their existing rejecting will. On the other hand, grace as a formal cause moves the agent to desire union which they had no inclination either way. Therefore, grace would not oppose an agent's quiescent will.

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This also prevents Pelagianism since a person does not perform a praiseworthy act of the will. Stump argues a very particular type of quiescence is needed for God to infuse the grace of justifying faith which isn’t a praiseworthy act of the will but is still in a person's control. She writes that the ‘will’s quiescence is a privation of a previously inhering form’ (Stump, 2003, p397). In other words, a person must first reject God’s grace and union and then move to quiescence by ‘surrendering to God’s Grace’ (Stump, 2022, p342,). Stump notes that ‘Willed inattention’, a person choosing to be quiescent, is not the right type of quiescent, rather a person has control in surrendering to God without actively willing it.

Stump provides a helpful analogy of a needle-phobic person who becomes quiescent regarding a doctor giving them medicine (Stump, 2003, p398). A person may never be able to accept a doctor giving them an injection and reject the doctor administering the medicine. However, after persuasion from the doctor, their resistance is ‘driven out’ by a quiescent will. A will which is ‘divided against itself’ and therefore unable to accept or reject the injection. They cease having an action of the will, neither accepting nor rejecting. This quiescent state was not willed but rather the divided will has caused a quiescent state. Therefore, a doctor might administer the injection without going against the patient's will despite then being unable to accept it.

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Active non-resistant non-believers
Following this account of grace, if someone has a desire for a filial relationship with God, then they have already surrendered and become quiescent to God's grace in some respect. But if they have become quiescent to God's Grace it would seem to follow that they have a relationship with God since they have surrendered and given themselves to God's Grace. Their will has shifted from rejecting God to being quiescent in relation to God.
Furthermore, as Pinsent stated, Grace imprinted a person with ‘moral, intellectual, and spiritual dispositions… [which allows us to relate as] children of God.’ (Pinsent, 2021, p1). Once a person has surrendered and become quiescent in the right respect, they then see the thing they surrender to (God) as a father. Therefore, upon receiving grace they stand as a child in relation to God as a father.
Consequently, the only people who can fulfil the category of active non-resistant agents are people who have already surrendered to God's Grace and want to stand in a filial relationship with God. To surrender to God’s grace would seem to require propositional belief in a God concept to surrender to. Grace then makes this surrender to a God concept explicit as a filial relationship. Therefore, this provided a theological argument for there being no active non-resistant agents who lack propositional belief.

 

Stumps Propositional Belief objection​

Fixing Schellenberg’s argument
Following this, we can adapt Schellenberg's argument in line with Moser’s objection by changing God's openness to mean openness to a loving filial relationship and non-resistant to be only active non-resistance. Premises 4 and 5 would look like this:
P4: If God is always open to a personal relationship, then no active non-resistant person would lack the propositional belief God exists.
P5: There is ‘at least one’ active non-resistant person who lacks propositional belief that God exists.
Moser's claim that there are no active non-resistance non-believers can be supported not only on empirical grounds but the theological argument above. Therefore, Schellenberg has failed to demonstrate a case of divine hiddenness contradicting an omnibenevolent God.

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Empirical Objection
However, one objection is that there are genuine active non-resistant non-believers. Schellenberg’s argument is empirically testable. Therefore, someone may say that they genuinely want a filial relationship and lack propositional belief in God. This would present a case of divine hiddenness which would seem to contradict an omnibenevolent God on Moser's account.

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Stump and Propositional Belief
Stump provided a strong argument which allows for the possibility of active non-resistant agents who lack the propositional belief God exists without contradicting God's all-loving nature and its desire for union (Stump, 2021, p18). Stump argues that propositional belief is not necessary for a personal relationship. Consequently, even if Schellenberg’s adapted argument found an active non-resistant non-believer, it does not demonstrate divine hiddenness contradicts God's omnibenevolent nature since premise three would be false. You can have a personal relationship without propositional belief.

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First, Stump argues that propositional belief is not necessarily required for a personal relationship in cases where a person has multiple descriptions (Stump, 2021, p18). For example, you may know the Duke of Cornwall, Prince William, exists and even have a personal relationship with him. But you probably lack any propositional belief in the ‘Earl of Chester’. Despite this lack of propositional belief, you would still have a personal relationship with the Earl of Chester since he is the Duke of Cornwall. Likewise, you could have a personal relationship with God under a different description.

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Second, Stump provides a distinct but similar example where a person is having a ‘Hallucination’ (Stump, 2021, p18). Imagine you perceive a nurse looking after you. You could be convinced they are a hallucination and lack propositional belief they exist. Perhaps you are receiving drowsy medication which makes you think you are seeing things or perhaps someone convinced you to doubt your perception of the nurse. Despite this, you could still have a personal relationship with the nurse. She could still impact your life in a meaningful way while caring for you. Likewise, you may be convinced God isn’t real but still have a relationship with him being transformed by his grace.

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Consequently, these two examples demonstrate that a person can lack propositional belief and still have a personal relationship. Therefore, someone who has surrendered to and wants a filial relationship with God as a father (an active non-resistant non-believer) could have a personal relationship with God without having a propositional belief God exists.

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Stump provided an example of this based on the ‘Doctrine of divine simplicity’ which states ‘God is being’ (Stump, 2021, p19). On Thomist metaphysics being is goodness and what is good is desirable. Consequently, beauty is a part of goodness. ‘Aquinas puts it, beauty is goodness perceptible to the senses’ and ‘so in knowing goodness or in sensing beauty, a person is also knowing God, to one degree or the other’. Therefore, we can conceive of a person who lacks propositional belief God exist but still has a personal relationship with God. A person could experience great beauty and goodness in their life without knowing that the concept of goodness is also a concept of God. It is this goodness that someone may have surrendered and become quiescent to. Hence, God could infuse them with grace and allow them to first desire union with God and be morally transformed towards the good.

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Furthermore, Stump presents a historical case where this happened (Stump, 2021, p19). Turnbull, an anthropologist who travelled around America, writes about a Jesuit Priest who evangelised a pygmy tribe by telling them that their ‘God of the forest’ was the God of Christianity. The ‘Pygmies … were entirely insulated from contact with Christian belief’ and would have had no propositional belief in Christ or the Christian God. Yet they still had a personal relationship with God. This personal relationship with God and the beauty of the forest allowed them to have a concept of God and form a relationship even though if they were asked before if they have a personal relationship or propositional belief of the Christian God they would have said no.

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Therefore, Stump has provided a defence against an empirical objection from an active non-resistant non-believer since they could still have a personal relationship without propositional belief. Their experience of divine hiddenness does not contradict an all-loving God as they still have union and a personal relationship with God. Their lack of propositional belief does not prevent this union and God may have a justified reason for preventing them from having propositional belief. Such as preventing pride or perceiving God as authoritarian.

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Furthermore, Stump's example fits well with the account of Grace we gave before. If they have a desire for a filial relationship, then they would have received God's grace. Grace can only be given if someone surrenders to God's grace with a quiescent will. Therefore, they would have had to have rejected and then surrendered to a God concept, such as goodness, even if they did not know it. Moreover, once they have been graced, they will have a desire for a filial relationship with God. Even if they do not believe God exists, their desires would be situated as a child in relationship to a concept of God and wanting to submit to God's moral goodness. This is analogous to the type of relationship that Stump's example of beauty and the Pygmy tribe suggests is a personal relationship. As a result, Schellenberg’s argument has not demonstrated the incompatibility between divine hiddenness and an omnibenevolent God. Not only is it unlikely that active non-resistant non-believers exist (attacking premise 5) but if they do Stump's argument above allows for a personal relationship without propositional belief (Attacking premise 3).

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Conclusion
I have presented Schellenberg's argument for the incompatibility between divine hiddenness and an omnibenevolent God. I then presented an objection from Moser which made a distinction between active and passive non-resistance and argued that an all-loving God is compatible with there being passive non-resistant non-believers. Moreover, I argued that not only can we make an empirical claim there are no active non-resistant non-believers but that there is a theological argument which suggests there cannot be any active non-resistant non-believers because of the doctrine of Grace. I then presented a possible reply someone could make claiming to be an active non-resistant non-believer but showed that this would not necessarily prove divine hiddenness is incompatible with an omnibenevolent God since propositional belief is not necessary for a personal relationship. Consequently, Schellenberg has not provided a case of divine hiddenness which contradicts an omnibenevolent God. Therefore, Divine Hiddenness is compatible with an omnibenevolent God.

 

 

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