McTaggart & Time
Does McTaggart succeed in establishing that time is unreal?
Introduction
The reality of time is incredibly intuitive to experience and establishing time is unreal is no mean feat. Philosophers have widely discussed McTaggart's argument; however, those who do not believe it is successful disagree on exactly what grounds. For McTaggart to succeed in ‘establishing’ the unreality of time he must demonstrate his account of time is the most plausible option. If there are other plausible options, then he has failed to establish time is unreal. I believe he ultimately fails to establish that time is unreal as presentism offers an equally plausible alternative for the reality of time which his argument fails to account for. In this essay, I will present and defend Mctaggarts argument for the unreality of time. I will then present presentism as an object against his weakest premise namely that the A series is contradictory. This provides an alternative view in support of the reality of time. I will then defend the presentist account of time. Consequently, if I can defend presentism as a plausible account then Mctaggarts fails to establish time is unreal. I believe McTaggart is not successful in establishing that time is unreal.
McTaggart’s Argument
McTaggart's view of temporal ordering
It is important to note two ways of ordering time which are essential in understanding Mctaggarts argument. McTaggart characterises time as a series of ‘Positions’ or events (McTaggart, 1921, §305). These positions or events can be listed t1, t2, t3, t4 … etc. McTaggart argues that all of these events or positions can be temporally ordered in an ‘A series’ or ‘B series’.
Events order in an A series are ‘Past, Present, or Future’ (McTaggart, 1921, §306). There are present events like you reading this paper, which was a future event and will become a past event. All events in time have an intrinsic tense quality of pastness, presentness or futureness. If event t1 has the tense quality of pastness then event t2 may have the tense quality of presentness. A series events have tense qualities. On the other hand, the B series views events in time as having “relations of ‘earlier than’ or … ‘later than’”. Therefore, events are distinguished by their relations of coming before or after other events. The event of reading this paper is later than the event of you picking up this paper and earlier than the event of having read this paper. Events have extrinsic relational qualities with respect to other events. From these two characterisations of time, we can think of the collection of events ordered with tense properties or in relation to other events.
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No change means no time
McTaggart argues that ‘there could be no time if nothing changed’ (McTaggart, 1921, §309). This is fairly uncontroversial as how can you distinguish different times if an event does not change? We only know that time has passed by observing change and if there is no change, including mental states or relational change with distant matter, then we presume no new events in times have occurred. Consiquently, our epistemic experience motivated this argument. Furthermore, imagine if everything in the universe was frozen with no possible change. If time passes then our frozen universe would have two positions of time, t1 and t2. However, one point in time could not be distinguished from another since there is no change. Consequently, Leibniz's law would be violated as t1 is identical to t2.
This is McTaggarts most compelling premise and we have presented two strong reasons to believe if no change occurred then there is no time.
Change is only possible on the A Series
Mctaggart argues only the A series involves change (McTaggart, 1921, §310-311). He writes ‘The relations of earlier and later are permanent’; thus, there is no change in the B series. The event of an agent reading does not change in any way but is only distinguished by a ‘later than’ relation to a different event of them having read. These relational facts never change as the relations between events are static. The events of yesterday will always be relationally before the events of today. Consequently, events in the B series never change.
This leaves the A series as the only option since facts about events change (McTaggart, 1921, §311). An event is in the future, it will become present and then past. The same event changes in regards to its tensed quality. The event of an agent reading presently will change to a pastness tensed quality where the agent had read. Therefore, only the A series involves change as the tense facts of events change from future to present to past.
McTaggarts Parodox and the A series
If time involves change and change only occurs in the A series then if the A series does not exist, time does not exist. The most important premise of McTaggart's argument is that the A series does not exist because it leads to a ‘contradiction’ (McTaggart, 1921, §329). McTaggart first argues that past, present or future qualities are ‘Incompatible determinations’. Meaning an event cannot be both past, present and future without those qualities contradicting each other. An event x can not be happening now in the present and is going to happen in the future. Consiquently, if an event can have more than one tense quality then the event is contradictory and does not exist.
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Following this McTaggart argues events in the A series instantiate multiple tense qualities. He writes ‘if M [an event] is past, it has been present and future’ then event M have all three tense qualities (McTaggart, 1921, §329). As we have shown, there is a collection of events, t1, t2, t3, t4 … etc. If change occurs then these events will instantiate future, present and past tense qualities. The future event t1 becomes a present event and then a past event. However, this would mean t1 instantiates all three tense qualities. Therefore, the A series is incompatible.
An immediate objection is that events do not instantiate multiple tensed qualities at the same time but rather an event is ‘present, will be past and has been future’ (McTaggart, 1921, §329). Consequently, an event never has more than one tense quality. It was a future event but is now a present event and then later it will become a past event. Therefore, events never instantiate multiple tense qualities.
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However, Mctagger argues this is equivalent to saying an event is ‘present at a moment of the present time, past at some moment of the future time and future at some moment of past time’(McTaggart, 1921, §330). McTaggart's critique here is that saying an event will be, has been or is now is appealing to a privileged time but then what explains that time? If the privilege time is an event within the A series then every event would have a different tense quality in respect of the other event. This would lead to events instantiating multiple tense qualities. Therefore, it must be a second privilege time outside of the A series. However, as we have shown positions in time are ordered in an A series or B series. We can not appeal to B series time since the A series would collapse into being the B Series, and thus wouldn’t exist (Dyke, 2002, p140). Therefore, we have to appeal to an A-Series view of time. But if we appeal to a second A Series then we are faced with the same problem. Therefore, we get an infinite regress (McTaggart, 1921, §330).
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To illustrate this point further, imagine an event t2 which is in the future. If change occurs then event t2 will become present and then past. Event t2 can not instantiate multiple tense qualities. Therefore, one will argue that event t2 doesn’t instantiate all tense qualities at the same time, rather it is in the future, will be present and then past. However, this appeals to a second time. Consiquently, the A series theorist has two options. First, they could appeal to another A series for an account of time. But this will lead to an infinite regression since another A series is required to explain changing time in that A-series which requires another A series and so on… A second option is appealing to itself. Event t2 is present at event t2 therefore, events before it, like event t1, are past in regards to event t2 and events after it, like event t3, are future in regards to event t2. However, if change occurred event t3 can be present. If it is present then it is present in respect of being at event t3 now therefore event t2 will be past but only in regards to event t3. Consiquently, events will instantiate multiple tense qualities as each event has different tense qualities in regard to other events. Therefore, we can not appeal to time within or outside of the A series.
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One interpretation may rebuttal the claim the A series could exist as events are static. So that events which are present are always present or past events always past thus preventing contradiction. However, a static A series is not an issue for McTaggart as this would simply show time does not exist as events never change tense qualities. It is this view of the A series which McTaggart paradox argues is contradictory and does not exist. This presents a difficult challenge to A series time since events instantiate multiple tense qualities which contradict each other. Contradictory events can not exist. Consiquently, A series time does not exist.
Summary of Mctaggarts Argument
Following all this, Mctaggart has presented a good argument against the reality of time. We can summarise his argument in the following way: If there is no change then there is no time. Change only occurs in the A series. The A series does not exist if change occurs (Because it leads to contradiction). Consiquently, time does not exist
Presentism Objection
Presentism objection
I believe the strongest objection against McTaggart's argument is presentism (David, 2018, p48). Presentism is the view ‘that only present entities exist and what is present really changes’. Presentism is an A series, as events have the tense quality of presentness. However, the presentist versions of the A series is different from McTaggarts as only present events exist. Past and future events lack ontological existence. There is a present moment of you reading a line of this essay but that event ceases to exist and a new present moment of you reading the next line comes into being. The past is what once existed in the present and the future is what will exist in the present but neither the past nor future are ontological existing events. If an event does not exist then it can not instantiate any tense qualities. Consiquently, events will never instantiate pastness or futurness. The presentist A series does not distinguish past, present and future events by the different tense qualities they instantiate. Rather, only present events instantiate a tense quality and what is present changes, coming in and out of being. As a result, presentism prevents events from instantiating past and future tense qualities because those events cease to exist. Consiquently, McTaggart’s paradox fails as A series can exist without contradiction.
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McTaggarts Paradox occurs because all events, t1, t2, t3, t4 … etc, have the same ontological existence. Therefore, when an event changes from future to present to past it instantiates all three tense qualities. However, if we understand time as present events coming in and out of being, instead of changing tense qualities, then there will be no issue of events instantiating multiple tense qualities. The A series can exist without contradiction.
To illustrate the point, imagine event t1 which comes into being and thus is present. Event t1 instantiated the tense quality of presentness and has ontological existence. Event t1 will come out of existence and thus lose the tense quality of presentness. Event t1 does not then instantiate a pastness tense quality because no event exists which could instantiate a tense property. Consequently, events only instantiate a present tense quality. As Dyke writes, we can thus say Event t1 ‘is present, was future and will be past’ (Dyke, 2002, p144). As the only events that exist are present. Future events are events that will be present (Exist) and past events are events that were present (and did exist).
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Following this, the A series can exist and change without contradictory qualities, as present events are the only events which have the ability to instantiate tense properties. Consequently, as events come in and out of existence they gain or lose the present tense quality. Therefore, McTaggart's argument is unsound and does not establish the unreality of time because change in the A series can occur without contradiction.
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Presentism as a plausible account
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We have demonstrated an alternative A series which does not contradict itself. This opens the possibility time is real on presentism. However, McTaggart could still successfully establish time is unreal if presentism is not plausible or false. I do not believe presentism can be proved in a short essay however I believe it can be shown as a defensible and thus plausable position. To demonstrate the defensibility of presentism I will asses its strongest objection, the Truthmaking objection. If presentism can be defended from its most difficult objection then we have good reason for presentism being a plausible account of time. Consiquently, if presentism is a plausible alternative then McTaggart has not ‘established’ the unreality of time as we have equally good reason to accept presentism.
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Truth Maker objection against presentism
A difficult and common objection facing presentism is that it can not account for truthmakers. Truthmakers are ‘elements of our ontology’ which make something true (David, 2019, p106). This is to say that a claim is true if and only if there is something in reality which makes it true. Truthmakers are incredibly intuitive to reason. If claims do not require something in reality to ground its truth then it seems any statement could be true. Take the claim ‘There is a Dodo in the garden’. If this statement is true there must be a truthmaker which makes it true. In this case, there actually being a dodo standing in the garden. If a person insists there can be a Dodo in the garden without a truthmaker or a real Dodo in their garden we would think they are irrational or mad. Consequently, truthmakers ground truth and without them, truth statements seem untenable.
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The truthmaker objection against presentism argues that it fails to account for truth claims about the past. Eternalism, the view that past, present and future events have the same ontological existence, can account for truth claims about the past because there are past events that make those claims true (Effingham, 2023, p67). Truth claims about the past are made true by truthmakers because there exist concrete events in reality which make those claims true. For example, ‘WWII ended in 1945’ is true because there exists an event of WWII ending in 1945.
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However, Presentism argues only present events exist. The events of Aristotle writing the Nicomachean Ethics, WWII and you waking up this morning are all events that no longer exist. There is nothing in our ontology which constitutes these events existing. Consiquently, it seems there is no truthmaker for statements about the past. If only the present exists then past and future events, have no ontological existence. The claim “WWII ended in 1945” cannot be a true claim as there is no event which grounds it as true. No past existing event that the truth claim could appeal to. As a result, the truthmaker objection makes presentism implausible because it can not account for true claims about the past. Therefore, presentism is not a plausible alternative against McTaggart's argument.
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Modal Proposition Rebuttal
The best rebuttal against the truthmaker objection is attacking the standards of truthmakers. The truthmaker objection is presuming all truthmakers are the same. It is incredibly intuitive to reason for truth claims about the present to require concrete events or objects for its truth value, as we saw in the Dodo example. But to suppose all truth claims require this standard is question-begging and need not exclude the presentist account of time.
Effingham presents a strong argument from ‘Modal Propositions’ to illustrate that not all truthmakers require wholly existing entities (Effingham, 2023, p67). Modal propositions are claims about how the world ‘could be or must be or cannot be’. For example, “WWII could have been avoided”, “if your parents never met then you would not have been born” or “You could have chopped your hand off yesterday”. These statements are ways the world could have been. People often utter counterfactual sentences similar to these which they believe are true. However, intuitively most people do not believe there exists an event of WWII being avoided, your parent never meeting or a concrete version of you without a hand. Rather these statements do not need truthmakers of this kind. The truthmakers for counterfactuals could be based on an agent's practical reasoning with imagination and facts about how the world presently is. For example, I know that I had access to a tool which could remove my hand, I can imagine that if I used that tool it would remove my hand and it was a possibility for me to do although I chose not to. This grounds the truth without appealing to an actual event where someone chopped off their hand. Consequently, this argument shows that truthmakers are not necessarily committed to wholly existing events for truth claims. Therefore, the truthmaker objection against presentism is unsound as truthmakers do not require concrete events or objects to exist for those claims to be true.
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Modal realism
One objection is to persist in arguing that truthmakers require wholly existing events for truth claims. Philosophers, such as David Lewis, argue that there are truthmakers for modal propositions. ‘Modal realism, [is the view] which holds that our world is but one world among many.’ (Lewis, 1986, p2). For every possible modal claim, there is a real concrete world in which a truthmaker can be made. The modal proposition “I could have cut off my hand yesterday” is true because there really exists a possible world where a counterpart of you cut off their hand. Therefore, there are truthmakers for modal propositions as they refer to real states of possible worlds.
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However, commitment to modal realism may preserve this kind of truthmaker but at the cost of a heavy intellectual price tag (Effingham, 2023, p67). First, modal realism is committed to a near-infinite number of worlds for every possible state. This gives modal realism a large ontology which is not obvious if it is required. Thus making it less parsimonious. Second, it is highly counter-intuitive. To believe there exists a world for every possible outcome is an extraordinary claim and I see no reason to believe it. The original motivation for truthmakers was that they are intuitive to reason for claims about the present. But if claims about the past event requires a commitment to counterpart versions of you for every possible proposition that could have been true of you then it is less intuitive to reason. Therefore, we have good reason to reject the truthmaker objection as it commits us to an extreme view of modal realism. Furthermore, if there is a more intuitive and parsimonious account of truthmakers which grounds truth without having to commit to modal realism we should accept it.
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Grounding truth
I believe there is a more intuitive and parsimonious truthmaker theory of past truth claims, namely Lurcretianism (David, 2019, p127). Truth claims about the past are true on Lurcretianism if the present world instantiates ‘primitive past-tensed properties’; meaning truthmakers for claims about past events are true if the world instantiates a past tense property or fact about what once existed. For example, the claim “WWII ended in 1949” is true because the world instantiates the fact or property of ‘having contained’ WWII ending in 1949. All events that come out of existence, and so are past, leave a tense property of having existed in the world. Therefore, truth claims about the past are true on Lurcretianism if the world instantiates the property or fact about that past event having existed.
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An objection that might be raised is against Lurcretian properties. One may argue the world instantiating tense qualities commits us to lots of properties making it less parsimonious and intuitive.
However, this criticism is weak as the alternative is far less intuitive and parsimonious. First, commitment to concrete past events for truthmakers is no less intuitive than the world instantiating primitive Lurcretian properties. We often think of the world instantiating properties, or fact, about what has existed (Feser, 2019, p301). Intuitively when someone says they used to own item x they are not saying there exists a past event of them owning item x but that there is a fact, or property of the world, which says they used to have item x. This shows the intuitive nature of Lurcretianism over an eternalised truthmaker theory. Second, as we have shown, if we are committed to truthmakers always relating to concrete events or entities then we have to believe in Modal realism. Which commits us to a near-infinite number of possible concert worlds existing. Lurcretian Presentism is a far more parsimonious theory as it is only committed to Lurcretian properties and the present instead of an infinite number of possible concrete universes. As a result, Lurcretianism presents a good alternative to ground truth.
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Someone may defend the parsimony of the truthmaker objection by arguing past truth claims require truthmakers but modal claims do not. Therefore, we do not need to be committed to modal realism (Effingham, 2023, p68).
However, this seems like cherry-picking. The original motivation for truthmakers about the past was that present truth claims need concrete events for its truth. But if Modal claims show that not all claims require wholly existing events for its truth values, the eternalist must show truth claims about past events need wholly existing events. If the eternalist is willing to concede truthmakers are not needed for modal propositions then they open the possibility for the presentist to say the same about claims about the past and future. Consequently, Presentism is defensible against the truthmaker objection as not only have we shown that truth claims do not need concrete events for its truth values with Effingham Modal argument but we have presented an alternative to grounding truth claims namely Lurcretianism. Therefore, McTaggart has not established the unreality of time since presentism is a defensible and plausible alternative account of time which allows the reality of time.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, we have presented McTaggart’s argument and shown it is unsound if presentism is true as presentism allows A series change to occur without contradiction. Therefore, if presentism is plausible then McTaggart has not established the reality of time.
We have then assessed the plausibility of presentism by defending it against one of its hardest objections namely the truthmaker objection. We demonstrated that truthmakers do not require concrete events to exist for truth claims with Effingham Modal argument and thus presentism is defensible against the truthmaker objection Furthermore, we presented an alternative truthmaker which grounds truth about the past with Lurcretianism and showed how it is a more intuitive and parsimonious theory. Consequently, this shows presentism is defensible. If presentism is defensible then it is a plausible alternative account of time. Therefore, McTaggart has not established the unreality of time as A series change is possible on presentism which is a plausible and defensible alternative account.
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